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Abstract. David Builes presents a paradox concerning how con-
fident you should be that any given member of an infinite collection
of fair coins landed heads, conditional on the information that they
were all flipped and only finitely many of them landed heads. We
argue that if you should have any conditional credence at all, it
should be 12 .
1. Introduction
David Builes (2020) presents a paradox. When you know that a
countable infinity of fair coins have been flipped and that only finitely
many of them landed Heads, what should your credence be that some
particular coin among them landed Heads? There are apparently strong
reasons to believe that your credence should be 0 and there are appar-
ently strong reasons to believe that your credence should be 1
2
.
We will argue that if you should have any credence at all that some
particular coin landed Heads conditional on only finitely many coins
having landed Heads, it should be 1
2
. We undermine the arguments
for 0 that Builes presents by pointing out that for each of them there
is a parallel and no less compelling argument for 1
2
. These arguments
appeal to modes of reasoning which proponents of nontrivial credences
conditional on credence-zero propositions have good reason to reject
in any case. But there are other strong arguments for 1
2
which do
not appeal to these modes of reasoning, and do not correspond to any
arguments for 0. We present two such arguments.
2. A Pair of Cases
Infinite cases are sometimes problematic in ways that their finite
analogues are not. Here’s a striking pair of cases.
Six coins: You are in a room with five other people. Each of you
flips a coin without looking at the result. You know that all of
the coin flips are fair and independent. You ask a nearby Oracle
whether more coins landed tails than landed heads. The Oracle
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replies affirmatively. What should your credence be that your coin
landed Heads?
This case is perfectly well-behaved. Initially, there are 64 possible
outcomes—32 in which your coin lands heads and 32 in which it lands
tails—and you should treat all as equiprobable. Of the 32 where your
coin lands heads, one has five tails and five have four tails. Of the
32 where your coin lands tails, one has six tails, five have five tails,
and ten have four tails. Given the Oracle’s revelation, those 22 are
the possibilities that remain. So your coin lands heads in six of the 22
live possibilities, and thus your credence that your coin landed heads
should be 6
22
.
Now consider an infinitary analogue.
Infinitely Many Coins: You are in a room with countably infin-
itely many people. (Most of them are very tiny.) Each of you flips
a coin without looking at the result. You know that all of the coin
flips are fair and independent. You ask a nearby Oracle whether
more coins landed tails than landed heads. The Oracle replies af-
firmatively. What should your credence be that your coin landed
Heads?
This case is not perfectly well-behaved. Initially, there are uncountably
infinitely many possible outcomes. Of those, countably infinitely many
are outcomes in which only finitely many coins land heads. Given the
Oracle’s revelation, those are the possibilities that remain. Among
them, countably infinitely many are possibilities in which your coin
lands heads and countably infinitely many are possibilities in which
your coin does not land heads. Combinatorics worked perfectly in the
finite case, but it provides no guidance at all in the infinite case.
3. Builes’ Paradox
It is not philosophically interesting that possibility-counting works
as a guide to credence in a finite case but not in an otherwise similar
infinite case. Fortunately, possibility-counting is not the only method
available for assigning credences in these cases, so it’s worth looking
at what other methods suggest. What is philosophically interesting is
that other methods seem to give inconsistent verdicts.
Builes (2020) argues that a case like Infinitely Many Coins presents
a paradox. Builes presents an argument that your credence that your
coin landed Heads should be 0 and a contrary argument that your
credence that your coin landed Heads should be 1
2
. We will begin by
sketching these arguments informally.
SOLVING A PARADOX OF EVIDENTIAL EQUIVALENCE 3
Argument for credence 0: Learning that only finitely many of the
coins landed heads should make you much less confident that your
coin landed heads. There’s nothing special about your coin that could
justify being confident that it is one of the vanishingly rare coins that
landed heads. Just as learning that more coins landed tails than landed
heads should make you less confident that your coin landed heads in
the finite case, it should do so in the infinite case. Indeed, since the
proportion of coins landing heads is 0, your credence that your coin
landed heads should be 0.
Argument for credence 1
2
: If you had instead learned that only finitely
many of the coins other than yours landed heads, that shouldn’t affect
your credences about your coin, since it wouldn’t have anything to do
with your coin. But you know for certain that the proposition that
only finitely many of the coins other than yours landed heads is true
if and only if the proposition that only finitely many of all the coins
landed Heads is true, so they should have the same evidential import.
Therefore learning that only finitely many of the coins landed heads
shouldn’t affect your credences about your coin. Since your initial
credence that your coin would land heads was 1
2
, your credence that
your coin landed heads should be 1
2
.
These each seem like good arguments. But they can’t both be right.
Note that neither argument depends on your picking out the coin in
question as yours. Both remain prima facie compelling if we assume
that you know of some eternal, qualitative property that distinguishes
your coin from the rest. Following Builes’s suggestion, we will assume
that this is the case, so as to set aside complications relating to the
epistemology of self-locating and de re belief. For concreteness, let’s say
that your coin is a nickel and all the other coins are quarters.1 It will
also occasionally be convenient to assume that each coin is inscribed
with a unique natural number: the nickel has number 0, and every
positive number is inscribed (in increasingly tiny decimal notation) on
1In Builes’s version, your coin is instead picked out as the only one tossed by a
person wearing a red shirt. None of the arguments we will consider suggest that it
could matter what the distinguishing qualitative property is, so long at there is no
chance at the relevant time (before the coins are tossed) of its having a different
extension than it actually has. But it is important that it be qualitative: if we
attempt to run the puzzle using the proposition that x landed heads for some
particular coin x, issues relating to the variety of ‘guises’ or ‘modes of presentation’
under which one could bear attitudes to such a proposition will loom large. See
Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio 2009 for difficulties which certain descriptive modes
of presentation raise for standard principles about chance and credence, and Dorr
2010 for difficulties involving ‘indexical’ modes of presentation.
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one of the quarters. And so that we can deal entirely in qualitative,
eternal propositions, let’s furthermore assume that these coins are all
the coins there will ever be, and that each will be tossed exactly once.2
Finally we will dispense with the Oracle, and understand the puzzle
as one about what your conditional credences should be, under circum-
stances where you have no relevant evidence beyond ‘the setup’: the
proposition that is exactly one nickel and a countable infinity of quar-
ters, each of which is tossed exactly once, and all these tosses are fair
and independent. Following Builes, we can articulate three inconsistent
claims, the second and third of which combine in the above argument
for credence 1
2
.
Relevance: Your credence that the nickel lands heads conditional
on the setup obtaining and at most finitely coins landing heads
should be 0.
Independence: Your credence that the nickel lands heads condi-
tional on the setup obtaining and at most finitely many quarters
land heads should be 1
2
.
Equivalence: Your credence that the nickel lands heads condi-
tional on the setup obtaining and at most finitely many coins
2In the version of the case where your only way of picking out your coin is by its
relation to you (because your evidence doesn’t tell you of any qualitative property
that you instantiate that infinitely many others don’t also instantiate), there is
a distinctive new argument that your credence should be 0, based on a popular
principle of self-locating indifference. In one version, this principle says that when
E is the strongest qualitative property for which your evidence entails that you are
E, and H is a qualitative proposition that entails that the proportion of all Es who
are F is x, then your credence that you are F conditional on H should equal x if
it is well-defined (see Elga 2004 and Dorr 2010; see also Manley MS and Dorr and
Arntzenius 2017 for more powerful principles about prior credences from which this
follows). When your evidence is just that you have a certain qualitative property
that infinitely many of the other coin-owners also have, the proposition that finitely
many coins landed heads entails that the proportion of people whose coins landed
heads among those that have that property is 0; so self-locating indifference entails
that your credence that you are such a person should be 0. (Dorr (2010) defends
an analogous view about a very similar case.)
Friends of self-locating indifference could go on to argue that 0 must also be the
right credence in the original version of the case, by appealing to the premise that
it is irrelevant whether the description picking out the target coin involves a quali-
tative property or a relation to the agent. But this argument is dialectically weak.
Since there is no prospect of a deduction of self-locating indifference from some
consistent indifference principle that also applies to purely qualitative propositions,
proponents of self-locating indifference had better think that self-locating credences
are subject to distinctive rational constraints. And if there are such constraints,
there should be no presumption that the two versions of the case are on a par.
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landing heads should be equal to your credence that the nickel
lands heads conditional on the setup obtaining and at most
finitely quarters landing heads.
Relevance, Independence, and Equivalence are each intuitively plausi-
ble. But they cannot all be true.3 Which should be rejected?
4. The Easy Way Out
We are open to taking the easy way out and rejecting all three prin-
ciples. All three principles presuppose that you should have credences
conditional on certain credence-zero propositions. But it is not ob-
vious that it is even possible for someone to have any credence in q
conditional on p while having credence zero in p.4 The difference be-
tween two credential states which differ only as regards credences con-
ditional on credence-zero propositions seems to make no behavioural
difference. The standard way of operationalising such differences con-
nects facts about your credences conditional on some credence-zero
p to facts about what your unconditional credences would be if you
‘learned’ p. But how could you learn p? Someone you trust could tell
you that p—but unless you are crazy, your credence that they would
never falsely tell you that p will be less than 1, so if you respond by
3If ‘should’ obeys a normal modal logic, the joint truth of all three principles
would imply the absurd conclusion that ‘You should do φ’ is true for every φ. One
might try to endorse all three principles by working with some weaker deontic logic
designed to accommodate ‘normative dilemmas’. But this way out of the puzzle
does not seem promising enough to be worth exploring.
4We are speaking here and throughout of conditional credence simpliciter: a re-
lation between a person, two propositions, and a number. We set aside concepts of
conditional credence where it requires an additional argument, such as a partition
or σ-algebra, such as those based on Kolmogorov’s (1933) theory of ‘regular condi-
tional probability’. These relativised notions of conditional credence are not quite
definable in terms of unconditional credence, but they come close: for details, see
Easwaran 2019 (§2) or Myrvold 2015 (§4). The uncontroversial good standing of
the relativized concepts means that rejecting non-relativised credences conditional
on credence-zero propositions is a less radical option than it might initially seem:
proponents of this option can interpret various claims that seem to be about unrel-
ativised conditional credences as involving a tacit partition argument. A proponent
of this view might conjecture that Builes’s paradox, like the widely-discussed ‘Borel-
Kolmogorov’ paradox (Myrvold 2015, §2), arises because finitely many coins landed
heads belongs to two different salient partitions, relative to which your conditional
credences should be 0 and 1/2 respectively. However, this conjecture is hard to
substantiate, since it is entirely unclear what the two partitions could be.
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conditionalizing on the fact that they told you p, you will just end up
with with credence 1 that they spoke falsely.5
Only a behaviourist could regard such considerations as decisive ob-
jections to the possibility of having nontrivial credences conditional on
credence-zero propositions.6 But even non-behaviourists can think that
there are deep constitutive links of some kind between credences and
behavioural dispositions. The difficulty in operationalising psycholog-
ical differences involving only credences conditional on credence-zero
propositions may thus be taken as a warning that we don’t really grasp
what such differences amount to.7 Paradoxes like Builes’s arguably
bolster this sceptical attitude: if certain putative psychological states
seem to be subject to conflicting rational requirements, the explanation
might be that the states didn’t really make sense to begin with.
5Perhaps you could end up with credence 1 in p thanks to a carefully aimed
blow to the back of the head, an appropriate course of brainwashing, or just a
sudden leap of faith. And perhaps some possible cases like that would be correctly
described as cases where you learnt (and thus came to know) p. Still, there is no
saying what unconditional credences you would end up with if you learnt p thanks
to some such odd process. You lack the stable dispositions that would constitute,
or be explained by, your having particular credences conditional on p.
6Even behaviourists need not regard them as decisive, since they have the option
of appealing to differences in language-related dispositions, e.g. dispositions to re-
spond to questions of the form ‘What is your conditional credence that φ given ψ?’,
or (as a referee suggested) to invitations like ‘Suppose for the sake of argument that
ψ’, etc. But it is implausible that having nontrivial conditional credences requires
having any familiarity with the relevant words in any language. And what condi-
tional credences should we ascribe to someone whose dispositions vary depending
on whether the questions are asked in English or French?
7The idea that there can’t be differences in conditional credences without dif-
ferences in unconditional credence doesn’t have to go along with the idea that
credences conditional on credence-zero propositions are undefined. One might in-
stead say that all such credences are identical to 1. (In Popper’s (1935) theory,
the conditional probability function is well defined for all pairs of arguments, but
there are some propositions, including contradictions, for which the function always
gives the value 1 when they are the second argument.) Or, more interestingly, one
might take the naturalness of certain partitions to ground the identification of one’s
credence in p conditional on a proposition q belonging to that partition with one’s
credence in p given q relative to that partition, using the partition-relative notion of
conditional credence mentioned in note 4: in favourable cases, this can be uniquely
fixed by unconditional credences by imposing a natural continuity requirement (see
Easwaran 2019, §2.3.3). Or one might use some other method to reconstruct condi-
tional credences from unconditional credences, e.g. looking at one’s unconditional
credences about conditional chances. But Builes’s paradox will not be very grip-
ping if we reconstruct conditional credences from unconditional credences in any of
these ways, since there is no relevant controversy about what your unconditional
credence function should look like.
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Even if we set this kind of scepticism aside and grant that it would be
possible for someone to assign a particular credence to the nickel landed
heads conditional on at most finitely many coins landed heads, it is still
not at all clear that it would be rational to do so. It is perfectly defensi-
ble to think that in some cases, although it would be possible to assign
a credence to p conditional on q, it would be irrational to do so.8 We
can’t think of any general principle that would mandate having a well-
defined conditional credence in the nickel landed heads conditional on at
most finitely many coins landed heads, except for principles that would
make it rationally compulsory to assign a conditional credence to ev-
ery pair of propositions one is capable of entertaining (perhaps with an
exception for logical contradictions and propositions one treats in the
same way one treats contradictions).9 Assuming that it is possible for
agents to have well-defined credences conditional on consistent propo-
sitions to which they assign credence zero, the view that they always
should have such credences has certain attractions (see Elga 2010). But
that view also leads to various kinds of unsettling arbitrariness in the
assignment of conditional credences.10 Many philosophers will think
8For example, it is arguably irrational to have any credences conditional on a
contradiction—though if the contradiction is subtle, it may still be possible. It
is widely, though not universally, held that there are some cases where it would
be irrational to assign any unconditional credence to a certain proposition; if so,
presumably the same phenomenon will arise with conditional credences. For an
overview of such cases involving deliberation see Levi 2007. For an overview of
such cases involving non-measurability see Hájek, Hawthorne, and Isaacs MS.
9Although Builes draws on Hájek (2003) to bolster his case that credence condi-
tional on credence-zero propositions are sometimes well-defined, Hájek argues only
that certain, especially natural credences conditional on credence-zero propositions
are well-defined. The credences Builes’ case relies on are not among those.
10Consider the collection C of all (finite or infinite) Boolean combinations of
propositions of the form coin n lands heads. Any permutation pi of the natural
numbers generates a permutation pi∗ of C in an obvious way. It is tempting to think
that your conditional credences as regards these should be permutation invariant,
in the following sense: for each permutation pi and any p and q in C, Cr(p|q) =
Cr(pi∗(p)|pi∗(q)) if Cr(p|q) is well-defined. But if Cr(p|q) exists for every consistent
p and q in C, there is no way to satisfy permutation invariance. Suppose for
contradiction that you did. Let h be exactly one coin landed heads, or more strictly,
the disjunction of all conjunctions which contain coin n landed heads for exactly
one n and coin m did not land heads for every m ̸= n. pi∗(h) = h for every
permutation pi. Since there is a permutation that interchanges an even-numbered
coin landed heads and an odd-numbered coin landed heads, permutation invariance
requires your credences in these two propositions conditional on h to be equal, hence
1
2 . But since there is also a permutation that maps an even-numbered coin landed
heads to an odd multiple of 3 landed heads and maps this to an odd non-multiple of
3 landed heads, permutation invariance also requires your credences in these three
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it more rational to avoid such arbitrariness by refraining from having
well-defined conditional credences for some pairs of propositions. And
once we allow that this is the right strategy in some cases, it would
be quite natural to think that the solution to Builes’s paradox is that
the relevant conditional credences should not be well-defined, if that
the arguments for Relevance, Independence, and Equivalence all looked
strong on the assumption that they are well-defined.
But we are not convinced that this is the right way out. From now
on, we will proceed on the assumption that you should have should
have well-defined conditional credences for all the relevant pairs of
propositions. We will also grant the stronger assumption that there
are specific conditional credences that you should have. Working un-
der these assumptions, we will argue that whereas Equivalence and
Independence are supported by strong arguments, the arguments for
Relevance merely dramatise some surprising structural features which
proponents of credences conditional on credence-zero propositions al-
ready need to learn to live with. Thus, the paradox does little to ad-
vance the case against the possibility of rationally having well-defined
conditional credences for the relevant propositions.
5. Equivalence: A Hill to Die On
As Builes explains at the end of his paper, on the assumption that the
relevant conditional credences are well-defined, Equivalence can be de-
rived straightforwardly from the Multiplicative Axiom for conditional
probability, which says that when Cr is your conditional credence func-
tion,
Cr(p ∧ q|r) = Cr(p|q ∧ r)Cr(q|r)
whenever all three terms are defined. An immediate consequence of
this principle is that when Cr(q|r) and Cr(r|q) are both 1,
Cr(p ∧ q|r) = Cr(p|q ∧ r) = Cr(p ∧ r|q)
But when Cr(q|r) = Cr(r|q) = 1, we also have Cr(p|r) = Cr(p ∧
q|r) and Cr(p|q) = Cr(p ∧ r|q).11 So the Multiplicative Axiom has
the important consequence that when your credence in each of two
propositions conditional on the other is 1, they are interchangeable in
the second argument of your conditional credence function:
Cr(p|q) = Cr(p|r) whenever Cr(q|r) = Cr(r|q) = 1
propositions conditional on h to be equal, hence 13 . Thus you can obey permutation
invariance only by lacking well-defined conditional credences for some of the pairs
of propositions just considered.
11Since Cr(p|r) = Cr(p∧ q|r) +Cr(p∧¬q|r) and Cr(p∧¬q|r) ≤ Cr(¬q|r) = 0.
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In the case at hand, the conjunction of the setup with finitely many
coins land heads and the conjunction of the setup with finitely many
quarters land heads logically entail one another, so your credence in
each conditional on the other should be 1. This implies given the above
theorem that your credences in the nickel landed heads conditional on
these two propositions should be equal.12
The Multiplicative Axiom is intimately related to the principle that
whenever your unconditional credences Cr(p ∧ q) and Cr(q) and your
conditional credence Cr(p|q) are all well-defined,
Cr(p ∧ q) = Cr(p|q)Cr(q)
Given that Cr(p∧ q) = 0 whenever Cr(q) = 0, this is equivalent to the
familiar ‘ratio formula’, according to which
Cr(p|q) = Cr(p ∧ q)
Cr(q)
whenever all three terms are defined and Cr(q) > 0. This formula plays
an absolutely pervasive role in reasoning about probability; denying it
would throw the entirety of Bayesian epistemology into disorder. But
there seems to be something unstable about a view that accepts the
ratio formula (as a constraint on rational conditional and unconditional
credence) while rejecting the Multiplicative Axiom. If one’s credences
conditional on r correspond in the usual way to one’s dispositions to
respond to ‘learning’ r, and one violates the Multiplicative Axiom with
respect to p, q, and r, then one will be disposed to violate the ratio for-
mula upon learning r. If this is a disposition to do something irrational,
it seems like a departure from rationality in its own right.
The Multiplicative Axiom seems moreover to do important work in
pinning down the very concept of conditional credence. It provides a
source of discipline that those who reject the project of defining condi-
tional credence in terms of unconditional credence can ill afford to let
go of. Without the Multiplicative Axiom, there is so little left to con-
strain our theorising about rational credences conditional on credence-
zero propositions that the entire topic risks seeming like a dead end.
6. Two Arguments for Independence
We will give two arguments for Independence. The first appeals
only to the symmetries of the setup, and is novel; the second deals
12The fact that these propositions logically entail one another means that on
many moderately coarse-grained theories of propositions, they are one and the
same, in which case we can derive Equivalence directly from Leibniz’s Law, without
any need to appeal to the Multiplicative Axiom.
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with objective chance, and is closely related to arguments which Builes
considers.
(i) Symmetry. Suppose we apply some paint to the coins. We paint
the Heads side of the quarters green and the Tails side of the quarters
blue, and we paint the Heads side of the nickel blue and the Tails
side of the nickel green. Nothing in this modification of the setup
privileges the property of landing heads over the property of landing
green. So, if there is a particular number x which should be your
credence that the nickel landed heads conditional on the conjunction of
the painted-coin setup with finitely many quarters landed heads, then x
should also be your credence that the nickel landed green conditional on
the conjunction of the painted-coin setup with finitely many quarters
landed green. Since those two conjunctions are logically equivalent,
the Multiplicative Axiom entails that they are interchangeable in the
second argument of your conditional credence function, as explained
in §5. So, x should also be your credence in the nickel landed green
conditional on the conjunction of the painted-coin setup with finitely
many quarters landed heads. But since the painted-coin setup specifies
how the nickel is painted, you should have credence 0 conditional on
this conjunction that the nickel both landed heads and landed green,
and credence 1 that it either landed heads or landed green. So the only
way to assign the same conditional credence to the nickel landed heads
and the nickel landed green is to assign 1
2
to both. And if your credence
should be 1
2
in the painted-coin variant of the setup, it should surely
also be 1
2
in the original version.13
One could resist this argument by insisting on some interpretation
of ‘the coin flips are fair and independent’ on which it is spelled out
in terms of ‘heads’ and ‘tails’ and thus might be thought to constrain
your credences about heads and tails in a certain way that it does not
constrain your credences about blue and green. But this is unpromis-
ing. Saying that a coin flip is ‘fair’ just means that the two sides of
the coin involved have the same chance of coming up (conditional on
its being tossed): it has nothing to do with what kinds of decorations,
if any, distinguish the two sides. And whatever exactly ‘independent’
means, it is presumably some general relation that can obtain between
chancy processes of all sorts, including processes that do not involve
coins at all.
13In fact the paint isn’t needed: we can run the symmetry argument directly in
the original case by replacing landing green with either landing heads and being a
quarter or landing tails and being a nickel.
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One could alternatively resist the argument by denying that there is
any particular number x that should be your credence that the nickel
landed heads conditional on the setup obtaining and finitely many quar-
ters having landed heads. Perhaps there are many different conditional
credences which you could permissibly assign to this pair of proposi-
tions. Or perhaps which particular credence you should have depends
on details of your situation which were left open by our stipulations,
such as your past experience with similar coins. However, this way of
resisting the argument is not open to proponents of the combination of
Relevance and Equivalence, who are committed to the view that there
is a particular credence you should have, namely 0.
(ii) Chance. If we allow for rational people to have well-defined
credences conditional on propositions in which their unconditional cre-
dence is zero, it is plausible that we should also allow for propositions to
have well-defined chances conditional on propositions whose uncondi-
tional chance is zero. And if we allow for primitive chances conditional
on chance-zero propositions, it is most natural to spell out ‘the coin
flips are fair and independent’ as follows: for any coin x, any side x′ of
x, and any consistent finite or infinite Boolean combination p of propo-
sitions each of which is of the form y on y′ for some coin y distinct
from x and some side y′ of y:
(*) Chancet(x lands on x′|p) = 12
where t is a time before any coins have been tossed, but after it has
been determined that all of them will be tossed exactly once.14
So in particular, the setup entails that (*) holds when x is the nickel,
x′ is its ‘tails’ side, and p is the disjunction of all conjunctions of collec-
tions of propositions which include exactly one proposition of the form
y lands on y′ for each quarter y, where y′ is the ‘tails’ side for at most
finitely many of the quarters and otherwise is the ‘heads’ side. But
there is no chance at the relevant time of anything changing whether
it is, a quarter, a nickel, or not a coin at all, or of any side of a coin
changing whether it displays heads or tails. So the setup also entails
14‘Fair and independent’ could also be given a weaker interpretation where (*)
need only hold when p is a consistent finite Boolean combination of propositions
about coins other than x. But the stronger interpretation is more natural, and
using the weaker one would get us bogged down in an unilluminating debate about
how confident you should be that the coin flips are independent in the strong sense,
conditional on their being fair and independent in the weak sense.
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that:
1 = Chancet(p | finitely many quarters land heads)
= Chancet(finitely many quarters land heads | p)
= Chancet(the nickel lands heads | p and x lands on x′)
= Chancet(x lands on x′ | p and the nickel lands heads)
Applying the Multiplicative Axiom for conditional chance, we can de-
duce that
Chancet(the nickel lands heads | finitely many quarters land heads) = 12
But you have no relevant evidence about how the coins landed be-
yond the setup. Given the Principal Principle connecting chance with
rational credence (Lewis 1980)—or, more precisely, the natural exten-
sion of this principle to conditional chance and conditional credence—it
follows that whenever the setup entails that the chance at some time
of p conditional on q is x, your credence in p conditional on the con-
junction of q with the setup should also be x.15 In particular, your
credence in the nickel lands heads conditional on the conjunction of the
setup with finitely many quarters land heads should be 1/2, in accor-
dance with Independence.16 Of course, the Principal Principle is not
completely uncontroversial, even for qualitative propositions. But the
main objections to it in the literature turn on a kind of ‘undermining’
15The relevant version of the unconditional Principal Principle says that where
Cr is any rational prior credence function, p is any proposition, and h is any
proposition entirely about history up to t and the chances at and before t that
entails that Chancet(p) = x, C(p|h) = x if it is well-defined. The conditional chance
version says that if p and q are any two propositions and h is any proposition entirely
about history up to t and the conditional chances at and before t that entails that
Chancet(p|q) = x, C(p|q ∧ h) = x if it is well-defined. In our application, h is the
setup. Since you have no relevant evidence, we can treat the question what your
credence should be as tantamount to the question what a rational prior credence
would be.
16One could run a parallel argument in the self-locating version of the case
discussed in note 2, replacing nickel with coin owned by you. The conclusion of that
argument conflicts with the credence of 0 prescribed by self-locating indifference.
But it is not news that self-locating indifference is inconsistent with the unrestricted
conditional-chance Principal Principle: the central example in Dorr (2010) also
shows this. Even for those firmly attached to self-locating indifference, rejecting
the conditional-chance Principal Principle entirely seems like an overreaction to
this conflict, since it leaves the concept of primitive conditional chance looking
worryingly underconstrained. If we don’t want to give up on primitive conditional
chance and credence, it seems more reasonable to hold on to the restriction of
the Principal Principle to qualitative eternal propositions, which is consistent with
self-locating indifference, and is all we need to argue for Independence.
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that can happen in Humean theories of chance, which does not look
like a promising line of resistance for proponents of Relevance.17
Since the chance-based argument for Independence relies crucially on
the setup’s entailing that there is no chance of objects changing what
kind of coin they are, etc., it is natural to wonder how things go if this
assumption is false. The answer, interestingly, is that in some cases like
this, the Principal Principle actually requires that your credence that
the nickel landed heads conditional on finitely many quarters landing
heads should be zero, if it is well-defined. Suppose that all coins start
out as quarters, and are tossed between t0 and t1. Between t1 and
t2, a demon will randomly choose exactly one coin to transform into
a nickel, in such a way that each coin has chance zero at t1 of ending
up as a nickel.18 Since chances are necessarily finitely additive, this
demon-setup entails:
(i) Every finite set of coins has chance 0 at t1 of containing a coin
that will become a nickel.
Moreover, since truths about which coins did and did not land heads
all have chance 1 at t1, and truths about set-membership have chance
1 at all times, the demon-setup also entails:
(ii) Whichever set S contains all and only the coins that landed heads
is such that the chance at t1 that a member of S becomes a nickel
equals the chance at t1 that a coin that landed heads becomes a
nickel.
17See Lewis 1994 for the problem of undermining and a revision of the Principal
Principle that avoids it. Note that Humean theories of chance raise a prima facie
worry about the very consistency of the setup with the proposition that finitely
many quarters landed Heads, since they suggest that an infinite collection of coin
flips only finitely many of which landed heads might ipso facto not be fair and inde-
pendent. And even if we admit the possibility of the case, Humeanism does nothing
to suggest that your conditional credence should be lower than 12—if anything, it
might motivate making it higher, on the grounds that having any one coin land
heads makes it just a little easier for the overall Humean mosaic to be one of those
that makes the coins fair and independent.
18This example requires the possible failure of the countable additivity princi-
ple for unconditional chance. For a version compatible with the necessity of this
principle, we could imagine that there are continuum many coins, one for each real
number in the unit interval, so that the demon can choose one by throwing a very
pointy dart at a target and measuring the distance to the centre. Alternatively,
we could just have the demon toss each coin a second time and transform all those
that land heads into nickels, and replace all our references to unconditional chance
with references to chances conditional on the proposition that only one coin lands
heads when tossed by the demon.
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The conjunction of (i) and (ii) with the proposition that the set of coins
that land heads is finite entails
(iii) The chance at t1 that a coin that landed heads becomes a nickel
is 0.
You should therefore have credence 1 in (iii) conditional on the con-
junction of the demon-setup with finitely many coins landed heads. So,
applying the Principal Principle to your credences about the chances at
t1, it follows that your credence that a coin that landed heads became a
nickel, conditional on that conjunction, should also be zero: Relevance
is true for this variant of the case.19
By granting that your conditional credence should be zero in the
demon version of the case, proponents of Independence can arguably
undercut some of the intuitive appeal of Relevance: this appeal may
be partly based on mistakenly assuming that the factors that distin-
guish the two versions don’t make any difference.20 Still, the idea that
the two versions require different credences is already quite surprising,
especially when we notice that the difference is entirely a matter of
temporal order: if, instead, we have the demon choose a coin between
t0 and t1 and have the coin flips occur between t1 and t2, the argument
from the Principal Principle to Independence will go through just as
before (taking the relevant time t to be t1). That is strange, since
either way there need be no causal connection between the demon’s
choice-process and the coin-tossing processes.21 This could be regarded
as providing further support for the claim that you should not have a
well-defined conditional credence either way. However, once we reflect
on the central role of time in the operative concept of chance, it be-
comes less surprising to find that questions of temporal ordering make
19Our earlier symmetry-based argument for Independence does not conflict with
this result. If the heads sides of the coins are initially blue and the tails sides green,
but the demon will swap the colours on whichever coin he turns into a nickel, there
is a relevant chance-theoretic asymmetry between heads and green: the analogue of
(ii) substituting ‘landed on the side that would end up green’ for ‘landed heads’ is
false.
20The conclusion may also be reassuring for proponents of Independence who
accept self-locating indifference and are thus committed to Relevance in the self-
locating version of the case (see note 2). If the self-locating version is analogous
to one of the two cases, it is not so surprising that it should be the demon version
rather than the original version, especially since the idea of self-locating indifference
is often heuristically expressed by formulae like ‘You should treat yourself as a
random sample’ (Bostrom 2002, Manley MS).
21To play this up, we could replace the demon with a random number-choosing
device located far from the coins, while replacing ‘nickel’ with ‘coin whose number
matches the one chosen by the device’.
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a difference. Even setting questions about credences aside, a plausible
‘reflection principle’ concerning the relation between chances at earlier
times and chances at later times entails that when the coins are tossed
first, the chance at t0 of a nickel will have landed heads conditional on
finitely many coins land heads is 0, whereas in the version where the
demon goes first, it is 1
2
.22 Given this striking chance-theoretic contrast
between the two versions of the case, the claim that there is a corre-
sponding rationality-theoretic contrast looks much less objectionable.23
7. Is there a case for Relevance?
It thus remains for us to address the arguments for Relevance de-
veloped in Builes’s paper. We will show that these arguments provide
no differential support to Relevance over Independence, since exactly
parallel arguments can be given for Independence. The arguments
just bring out surprising structural features which are inevitable con-
sequences of having any conditional credence function which assigns
credences conditional on some credence-zero propositions and meets
some minimal further constraints. Once this is recognised, the argu-
ments have no force either way. By contrast, there are no arguments
for Relevance analogous to our earlier arguments for Independence.
There is thus no parity between the two principles; Independence is in
strictly better shape than Relevance.
Builes gives three arguments for Relevance: the first turns on con-
siderations related to accuracy; the second involves a Dutch book; and
the third turns on general principles about the relationship between
conditional and unconditional probabilities. We will discuss them in
reverse order.
(i) Conglomerability. Assuming that you should have any credences
conditional on any credence-zero propositions, it seems plausible that
22The reflection principle we have in mind says that if h is entirely about his-
tory up to t+ and chances at and before t+, and entails Chancet+(p|q) = x, then
Chancet−(p|q ∧ h) = x if it is well-defined. Since this principle has the same form
as our conditional-chance Principal Principle, we can use it to run analogues of our
earlier arguments substituting chance at t0 for rational prior credence.
23We might wonder what happens in a version of the case where the demon’s
choice and all the coin-tosses occur simultaneously. The answer is that in that case,
our stipulations simply do not settle the question what the chance was that a nickel
would land heads. We could consistently elaborate the setup so as to entail that
this chance is 0, or 12 , or anything in between. And the question what our credence
should be conditional on the un-elaborated setup will depend on how we should
divide our credence among these different elaborations. (Cf. the discussion in Dorr
2010 (§6) of a structurally analogous case involving two different chancy processes,
namely the tossing of a single coin infinitely many times and the ringing of a gong.)
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for each natural number n, your credence that the nickel landed heads
conditional on the proposition that exactly n coins landed heads should
be 0. For as Builes argues, it would be bizarre for your credence in the
nickel landed heads conditional on exactly n coins landed heads to be
greater in the case where there are infinitely many coins in total than
it would be if the total number of coins was some finite number m ≥ n;
but since your credence should uncontroversially be n/m in the latter
case, the only way to satisfy this constraint is for it to be 0 in the infinite
case. But the proposition that only finitely many of the coins landed
Heads is logically equivalent to the disjunction of all propositions of the
form exactly n coins landed Heads. If your credence that the nickel lands
heads should be 0 conditional on each of these propositions, mustn’t it
also be 0 conditional on their disjunction? Suppose you have already
learnt that the disjunction is true but are still waiting to learn which
disjunct is true. Shouldn’t you set your credence to 0 now, given that
you know you will do so later when you have learnt one of the disjuncts?
This argument is in effect an appeal to a very natural principle—
conditional conglomerability. Conditional conglomerability says that
given any propositions p and q and any collection X of pairwise in-
consistent propositions whose disjunction is equivalent to q, if you are
rational and your credence in p conditional on each member of X be-
longs to a certain closed interval, then your credence in p conditional
on q also belongs to that closed interval.24 In this case, p is the nickel
landed heads; q is at most finitely many coins landed heads; X is the
collection of all propositions of the form exactly n coins landed heads;
and the closed interval is the singleton set {0}. Since your credence in
p conditional on each member of X belongs to this interval, conditional
conglomerability requires your credence in p conditional on q also to
belong to it, i.e. to be 0. Conditional conglomerability thus dictates
Relevance.
But it does not matter what conditional conglomerability dictates,
because failures of conditional conglomerability are almost inevitable
once we allow for primitive conditional credences on some zero-credence
propositions. To illustrate why, let pi for each natural number i be the
24Conditional conglomerability is the conditional-probability generalisation of
the concept of conglomerability introduced by de Finetti (1972, ch. 5): that is
equivalent to the special case of conditional conglomerability where q is logically
necessary, so that we can replace ‘your credence in p conditional on q’ with ‘your
credence in p’. If you violate conditional conglomerability with respect to p, q, and
X, you will be disposed, upon learning q, to violate conglomerability with respect
to a collection of propositions derived from X by disjoining the negation of q with
an arbitrarily chosen member of X.
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proposition the only coin to land heads was numbered 2i, 4i + 1, or
4i + 3, and let qi be the only coin to land heads was numbered 2i + 1,
4i, or 4i + 2. The disjunction of the pi and the disjunction of the qi
are both equivalent to exactly one coin landed heads. Once we allow
for primitive credences conditional on credence-zero propositions, it is
hard to deny that your credence in an odd-numbered coin landed heads
should be 2
3
conditional on each pi and should be 13 conditional on each
qi.25 But then conditional conglomerability imposes the unsatisfiable
requirement that your credence in an odd-numbered coin landed heads
conditional on exactly one coin landed heads be both 1
3
and 2
3
.26
So, appeals to conditional conglomerability cannot be relied upon
when we are dealing with credences conditional on credence-zero propo-
sitions. The only question is where and how it should fail. Builes is
25This could be argued for in several ways. One strategy appeals to ‘total out-
come indifference’: the plausible thesis that you should treat any two propositions
that fully specify how each coin lands as equiprobable, in the strong sense of as-
signing them equal credence conditional on anything they both entail. This implies
that conditional on pi you should assign the same credence (namely 13 ) to each
of only 2i landed heads, only 4i + 1 landed heads, and only 4i + 3 landed heads;
similarly for qi. Another strategy appeals to the permutation invariance principle
from note 10. Since the permutation that maps 2i to 4i+1, 4i+1 to 4i+3, 4i+3
to 2i and leaves every other number alone maps pi to itself, invariance under this
permutation requires your credences in only 2i landed heads, only 4i + 1 landed
heads, and only 4i+ 3 landed heads conditional on pi to be equal; similarly for qi.
26Schervish, Seidenfeld, and Kadane (1984) prove some general theorems which
show how hard it would be for conditional conglomerability to hold once we allow
some well-defined probabilities conditional on probability-zero propositions. One
theorem says that unconditional conglomerability must fail (with respect to some
countable partition) in any probability function for which countable additivity fails,
so long the range of that probability function is an infinite subset of the unit in-
terval. But whatever you want to say about countable additivity for unconditional
credences, countable additivity for conditional credences seems extremely implausi-
ble (assuming we allow for well-defined, non-partition-relative credences conditional
on zero-credence propositions). For example, if you thought that your credences
conditional on exactly one coin landed heads should be countably additive, you
would have to think that for some n, your credence in only of the first n coins
landed heads conditional on exactly one coins landed heads should be greater than
0.99, which seems bizarre. And the idea that there are only finitely many num-
bers that are your credence in some proposition conditional on exactly one coin
landed heads also seems completely implausible: for example, your credence in each
proposition of the form life evolved on exactly n planets conditional on exactly one
coin landed heads should plausibly be positive. Further theorems due to Schervish,
Seidenfeld, and Kadane (1984, 2016) show that even if we were prepared to accept
one of these very implausible things, maintaining conditional conglomerability in
full generality would require severe restrictions on the set of pairs of propositions
with well-defined conditional probabilities.
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right that rejecting Relevance leads under natural assumptions to fail-
ures of conditional conglomerability with respect to the collection of
propositions of the form exactly n coins land heads, whereas accepting
Relevance allows us to maintain conditional conglomerability for this
particular collection. But there are other collections for which reject-
ing Independence leads under equally natural assumptions to failures
of conditional conglomerability, whereas accepting Independence al-
lows us to maintain conditional conglomerability. One such collection
comprises the propositions of the form exactly n quarters land heads.
Your credence that the nickel lands heads conditional on each of these
propositions should plausibly be 1
2
: the reasoning behind Relevance
does nothing to undermine the plausibility of this. But the disjunction
of all these propositions is equivalent to only finitely many quarters
land heads. So to satisfy conditional conglomerability with respect to
this collection, your credence in the nickel landed heads conditional
on only finitely many quarters landed heads would have to be 1
2
, as
Independence says it should be.27 So, pending some new argument
that conditional conglomerability with respect to propositions about
how many coins landed heads is to be favoured over conditional con-
glomerability with respect to propositions about how many quarters
landed heads, appeals to conditional conglomerability do nothing to
favour Relevance over Independence. At most, appeals to conditional
conglomerability could be used to support the view that the relevant
conditional credences should be ill-defined (thus rejecting both Rele-
vance and Independence).
(ii) Dutch Books. Builes shows that accepting Independence and
rejecting Relevance disposes you to accept collections of bets which
guarantee a loss. Suppose that after having learned that only finitely
many of the coins landed heads, your credence that each particular
numbered coin landed heads is still 1
2
. In that case, you should be will-
ing to bet at favorable odds that each coin landed heads. But you are
certain that any infinite collection of such bets contains infinitely many
losing bets and only finitely many winning bets, thus guaranteeing an
infinite loss. In contrast, if you follow Relevance, you will reject all the
bets, and thus lose nothing.
27Another such collection contains, for each finite set S of positive numbers, the
proposition—call it zS—that all and only the quarters in S landed heads. The claim
that your credence in the nickel landed heads conditional on each zS should be 12
follows total outcome indifference (see note 25). But the disjunction of the zS is
also equivalent to finitely many quarters land heads, so conditional conglomerability
with respect to this collection also dictates Independence.
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This Dutch Book argument is, in effect, just highlighting a particular
failure of conglomerability. Whenever conglomerability fails, an agent
can fall prey to such an infinitary Dutch Book.28 It should therefore
be unsurprising, given that failures of conglomerability will arise upon
learning that only finitely many coins landed heads whether we follow
Relevance or Independence, to find that analogous Dutch Books can
be made against agents whose credences conform to Relevance. Let pn
be none of the first n coins lands heads. Having learned that finitely
many quarters landed heads, followers of Relevance will have credence
0 that each particular coin landed heads, and will therefore assign each
pn credence 1. But the conjunction of all the pn is equivalent to no
coins landed heads, and under plausible assumptions, your credence in
this proposition should be 0 even after conditionalizing on finitely many
quarters landed heads.29 Now consider the collection of bets b1, b2, . . .,
where bn pays out $2 if pn is true and costs $1 if pn is false. If you
follow Relevance, you will accept all these bets, even though you are
sure you will win only finitely many of those bets and lose infinitely
many of them, thus losing an infinite amount of money. By contrast,
if you follow Independence, your credences in p1, p2, p3 . . . will be 12 ,
1
4
, 1
8
. . ., so you will refuse all the bets after b1. In that case you are
not guaranteed a loss: you will come out ahead if the first coin lands
tails. Dutch Book arguments thus provide no support to Relevance
over Independence.
(iii) Accuracy. Builes shows that if you follow Independence, there
will be a collection of propositions for which you are guaranteed to have
infinite total inaccuracy given standard strictly proper scoring rules,
whereas if you follow Relevance you will have finite total inaccuracy
arising from those propositions. Consider the collection of all proposi-
tions of the form coin n lands heads. Upon learning that only finitely
many coins landed heads, you know that finitely many of those propo-
sitions are true and infinitely many of those propositions are false. If
you assign credence 1
2
to each one—as you presumably will if you follow
28Note that these Dutch books have a more respectable structure than those
employed in McGee (1999). Unlike those, these Dutch books can be constructed
with unconditional bets without infinite quantities of money being both gained and
lost.
29This follows from the principle of total outcome indifference (note 25). Given
the Multiplicative Axiom, that principle entails that conditional on finitely many
quarters landed heads, your credence in no quarters land heads must be equal to
your credence in the quarter numbered n was the only one to land heads, for each n.
Since all these propositions are pairwise inconsistent, the only way this can happen
is for all of them to be zero.
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Independence—you are thus guaranteed to accumulate infinite inaccu-
racy (assuming that having credence 1
2
in any false proposition makes
the same positive contribution to total inaccuracy). By contrast if you
assign credence 0 to each of those propositions, you will accumulate
only a finite amount of inaccuracy (assuming that having credence 0
in a false proposition makes no contribution to inaccuracy).30
It is somewhat difficult to know what to make of this argument.
When there are infinitely many propositions around, it is almost in-
evitable that you will have an infinite total inaccuracy score. It is not
clear why picking some particular collection of propositions where one
view leads to infinite total inaccuracy and the other view doesn’t would
have even prima facie force.
Even granting that this sort of accuracy argument has force, it too
highlights a particular failure of conglomerability. Whenever conglom-
erability fails, an agent can fall prey to such an infinitary accuracy
argument.31 It should therefore be unsurprising, given that failures of
conglomerability arise either way, to find that analogous accuracy ar-
guments can be formulated against agents who follow Relevance. Let
qn be the proposition that at least one coin lands heads and none of
the first n coins lands heads. Suppose that you accept Relevance and
learn that at most finitely many coins landed heads. Presumably you
will then have credence 0 that coin n landed heads for each n, but have
credence 1 that at least one coin landed heads, and thus assign cre-
dence 1 to each qn. But you are sure that at most finitely many of the
qn are true and the rest are false, so you are guaranteed to accumulate
infinite inaccuracy with respect to these propositions, assuming that
having credence 1 in any false proposition makes the same positive con-
tribution to inaccuracy. In contrast, if you follow Independence you
can (and presumably will) assign credence (1
2
)n to qn. Under plausible
assumptions about how inaccuracy is measured, this credence function
will accumulate only a finite amount of total inaccuracy as far as the
qn are concerned: your positive credences in the infinitely many false
qns sum to some finite amount, and hence the contributions of these
credences to your inaccuracy score also sum to some finite amount.32
30The most commonly discussed strictly proper scoring rules satisfy both of these
assumptions: see Joyce (1998, 2009).
31See Easwaran 2013 for arguments that accuracy-theoretic considerations re-
quire conglomerability.
32It is sufficient for there to be some positive constants c and ϵ, such that when-
ever x < ϵ, the inaccuracy contributed by having credence x in a false proposition
is no greater than cx. For this it is in turn sufficient for the function specifying the
inaccuracy contribution of a credence in any false proposition to be differentiable
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Accuracy arguments thus provide no differential support to Relevance
over Independence.
8. Conclusion
Builes’ paradox is initially gripping because we are prone to make
conditional conglomerability inferences. ‘Finitely many quarters land
heads’ makes salient the ‘How many quarters land heads?’ partition and
primes us to do conditional conglomerability reasoning for it. ‘Finitely
many coins land heads’ instead makes salient the ‘How many coins
land heads?’ partition and primes us to do conditional conglomerabil-
ity reasoning for it. But we know conditional conglomerability cannot
be good in general in the primitive conditional probability framework,
so it is simply a mistake to presuppose it here. Once we overcome
our temptation to make this mistake, it is straightforward to see that
Relevance must be false. What remains to be seen is whether Indepen-
dence is true, or rather trivially false because the relevant conditional
credences should not be well-defined.33
Cian Dorr
New York University
cian.dorr@nyu.edu
John Hawthorne
University of Southern California and Australian Catholic University
johnhawthor@usc.edu
Yoaav Isaacs
Baylor University
Yoaav_Isaacs@baylor.edu
on some closed interval [0, ϵ]: then c can be taken to be the maximum value of
the differential of the function on this interval. The strictly proper scoring rules
mentioned by Joyce (1998, 2009) all have this property.
33Thanks to an anonymous referee, whose questions and suggestions helped us
to sharpen the discussions of variants of the original case in note 2 and §6.ii.
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